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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of cost sharing in a marketplace on heterogeneous
firms’ sales strategy. Sharing costs means that firms in a marketplace do not need to build
independent sales channels, can easily collect information on competitors and consumers,
and share various services in the marketplace. As a result, less productive firms often
prefer to locate in marketplaces, whereas more productive ones tend to locate outside of
it.
To analyze the effects of cost sharing on a firms’ sales choice, we develop a Melitzstyle
model in which firms share fixed costs only in the marketplace. To sell its products to
consumers, each firm is required to locate in a marketplace or establish its own store
outside the marketplace (modern distribution channels). While locating in a marketplace
gives firms the advantage of share fixed costs, doing so also disadvantages them through
higher transaction costs (North, 1991). A modern distribution channel, on the other hand,
allows for lower transaction costs but higher fixed costs from independently establishing
a sales channel.
Under these settings, we find that introducing cost sharing provides a qualitative
change of conditions for firms’ sales strategies. Importantly, the size of population or
human capital influences the number of varieties, which further affects the size of a mar-
ketplace. Through shared fixed costs in the marketplace, firms tend to benefit much
more than competitors utilizing modern distribution channels. More precisely, less pro-
ductive firms can not survive without the marketplace but become profitable and survive
if a marketplace is available; this in turn increases the number of firms operating in the
marketplace. As a result, even consumers are better off because of the wider varieties
produced in the economy. Without sharing fixed costs in a marketplace, firms equally
benefit from the increasing size of population or human capital. In this case, there is no
reallocation of resources among firms in the marketplace and their competitors utilizing
modern distribution channels.
It is noteworthy that lower fixed costs for modern distribution channels due to the
deregulation of establishing such channels keeps the ratio of the indifferent productivity to
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threshold productivity unchanged. However, cost sharing increases threshold productivity
during the deregulation process, which in turn increases both the number of firms in the
marketplace and the total number of varieties, even though the fixed costs of firms only
outside the marketplace decreases. Thus, social welfare improves during the deregulation
process.
An existing paper that introduces cost sharing in a model for heterogeneous firms is
Krautheim (2012), which accounts for fixed costs of exporting which decreases with the
number of exporters. To determine the number of exporters, Krautheim (2012) assumes
that the total number of firms in an industry is fixed; under these conditions, the entry and
exit of firms into an industry is not affected, although cost sharing may impact the degree
of externalities. However, the assumption of Krautheim (2012) appears to be unrealistic
since, in reality, industries frequently experience the entry and exit of firms. The present
paper also constructs a model with heterogeneous firms and fixed cost sharing; however,
we consider an endogenous number of firms in an industry by introducing sharing fixed
costs, which thus qualitatively changes results in Melitz (2003). In doing so, we clarify
the gap between the case with and without shared fixed costs in a marketplace.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background
of our model. Section 3 develops a Melitz-style model to characterize the co-existence
of a marketplace and modern distribution channels as a benchmark model. Section 4
introduces costs sharing of the marketplace in the model. Section 5 clarifies the importance
of cost sharing and its implications for market equilibrium and social welfare. Section 6
concludes.
2 Background
Developing countries consist of several distribution channels, of which traditional mar-
ketplaces are the most popular worldwide. Marketplaces have played an important role
in China’s domestic trade circulation. During 1978–2003, the total number of market-
places in China increased from 33,302 to 81,017. In a mere decade, from 1990 to 2000,
the transaction volume of consumer goods in marketplaces accounted for 26.162.1% of
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Chinese total retail sales of social consumer goods.1 However, from 2006 to 2014, the
share of markets with a turnover of above 100 million yuan declined from 37% to 19%.2
Nevertheless, marketplaces remain key in China’s domestic distribution for the follow-
ing reasons. First, in addition to the above100millionyuan markets, there are more than
50,000 marketplaces whose transaction volume is below 100 million yuan, which have not
been accounted for in the data. Second, in recent years, e-commerce platforms have pro-
liferated in China. In 2015, the total online retail sales amounted to 2.79 trillion yuan
with a growth rate of 49.7%.3 From our definition of distribution channels shared by
a large number of smallscale firms with higher transaction costs and lower fixed costs,
e-commerce platforms are essentially similar to marketplaces.
On the other hand, as an economy develops, firms tend to own their distribution
channels, hereinafter “modern distribution channels.” An increasing number of firms with
high productivity levels in the manufacturing sector have begun establishing their own
sales networks. They organize a wider scale of sales agents to sell products; for example,
there are 300 apparel companies in the Rui’an wear cluster in Wenzhou, China (Ding
2012, Chapter 10). By 2005, these companies opened nearly 10,000 stores in China’s
domestic market.
Company L is representative of Rui’an’s casual wear company. In 2005, its production
output reached 6 million pieces, amounting to 80 million yuan in sales. Company L’s
products are mainly sold to midincome consumers of domestic mid and smallsized cities
and countylevel cities. It established more than 400 chain stores to cover the broad
geographical scope of Shanghai (5060 stores), Zhejiang Province (110 stores), Jiangsu
Province (just under 100 stores), and three provinces in Northeast China (100 stores).
Contrary to a firm in the marketplace, a company with its own sale network must bear
1Data are taken from National Statistics Trading, Goods and Materials Statistics Secretary (NST-
GMSS), ed. 1991-2001, Zhongguo Shichang Tongji Nianjian [Market Statistical Yearbook of China],
Beijing: China Statistics Press.
2Data are taken from China Statistical Yearbooks, National Bureau of Statistics of China, for the
calculation. We were able to retrieve data for only the so-called “above 100 million yuan markets.”
3Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201601/t20160119 1306083.html (accessed on March 1,
2016).
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higher fixed costs but lower transaction costs as imitation is more difficult.
Most booth keepers in marketplaces tend to be lessproductive SMEs. A good example
is the narrow fabric industry in Yiwu China Commodity City (Yiwu market). According
to Fah (2008), there are three types of firms in this industry: workshops (with an average
of less than 19 machines), factories (20100 machines), and companies (more than 100
machines). The number of machines represents the size of fixed costs. An ISO certificate
can be regarded an indicator of each firm’s productivity. Fah (2008) showed that of
those surveyed, 90% companies held ISO certificates, whereas only 33% factories and no
workshops were certified. In other words, a firm whose productivity is low incurs lower
fixed costs.
Marketplaces allow firms to have low fixed costs to sell their products, which stimulates
the development of small-scale firms in the following manner.
First, marketplaces provide a sales channel shared by small-scale firms. A firm can
meet numerous buyers every day and the larger the number of booths in a marketplace,
the greater the number of buyers. To access these buyers, a firm must pay a booth
rent and taxes as fixed costs and thus, saves various advertising and promotion costs.
Consequently, the necessary costs for each firm to search for a new buyer is considerably
low. In Yiwu’s narrow fabric industry, the average share of sales is 57% for workshops,
56% for factories, and 32% for companies (Fah 2008). In sum, the lower the productivity,
the smaller the firm size and higher the sales share in Yiwu Market.
Second, marketplaces help small-scale firms collect information on competitors and
consumers. A marketplace with a large number of sellers and buyers offer more oppor-
tunities to access information. An example is the Huaqiang North Market in Shenzhen,
which comprises 20,000 booths and 600,000 daily visitors (of these, 10,000 are profes-
sional buyers). According to a questionnaire survey of 56 local cellphone companies4,
45 companies consider Huaqiang North Market important or comparatively important
to acquire consumer demand information and 42 believe so for competitor information.
4Data are collected by Ke Ding and Shiro Hioki, the members of the research project the upgrading
of Chinas industrial agglomeration: an interdisciplinary approach of spatial economics and area-study
funded by a grant from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).
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However, given the easy accessibility to competitors information, the infringement of in-
tellectual property or imitation is more common in a marketplace. According to the
above mentioned questionnaire, 31 companies consider the Huaqiang North Market to
have intensified imitation activities among firms. As a result, firms pay more money to
continuously differentiate their products, which however are horizontally differentiated.
The products of a firm with lower fixed costs tend to be imitated more easily and thus,
the transaction costs for these lessproductive firms are higher. By contrast, firms with
high productivity generally construct their own sales networks and formulate their own
brand strategies. In this case, although the fixed costs are higher, the transaction costs
become much cheaper and the total profit margins are greater.
Finally, marketplaces provide various services to small-scale firms: the larger the num-
ber of firms in a marketplace, the greater the economies of scale at the level of a market-
place in providing services. For example, the Yiwu market established an international
logistics center that includes various facilities such as container yards, warehouses, deliv-
ery centers, unloading zones, shipment zones and parking areas.5 These logistic facilities
are shared by the large numbers of smallscale firms in Yiwu.
3 Benchmark model
The economy comprises a continuum of firms and under Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic
competition, each firm uses a unique production factor, that is, labor, to produce a
horizontally differentiated manufactured good with increasing returns to scale technology.
We denote the population of a country as E and each individual inelastically supplies one
unit of labor. Without loss of generality, we take labor as numéraire. Thus, the wage rate
w = 1 holds.










where Ω is the set of available varieties and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution be-
tween any two varieties. Following Melitz (2003), horizontally differentiated varieties are
5Source: http://baike.baidu.com (accessed on February 18, 2016).
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produced by firms bearing a fixed entry cost Fe (measured in units of labor). The in-
tertemporal discounting of capital is ignored, but firms die according to a Poisson process
with the hazard rate δ. After paying Fe, each firm draws an efficiency coefficient a from
the distribution function G(a) and density function g(a) over interval (0, a0]. Without
loss of generality, we assume that a0 = 1 holds.
Upon observing this draw, a firm may decide to produce and sell its products through
a modern distribution channel or marketplace, or exit immediately. We suppose that firms
in the marketplace enjoy low fixed costs f (measured in units of labor), whereas those in
modern distribution channels bear higher fixed costs F (measured in units of labor), that
is, F > f . Firms in the marketplace bear higher transaction costs, t > 1, while those with
modern distribution channels enjoy lower iceberg-form transaction costs T , with 1 < T <
t. Specifically, T < t indicates that the transaction cost in the marketplace is larger than
that in the modern distribution channel due to imitation in the marketplace. In other
words, the marketplace poses negative externalities. Further, the following assumption
holds:
F/f > Φ/ϕ > 1. (1)









, respectively. Substituting the above pricing strategies into their profit functions and
setting π(a) = Π(a) yields the indifferent productivity a, who is indifferent to entering the










where ϕ ≡ t1−σ, Φ ≡ T 1−σ and P is the consumer price index (CPI). Since Φ > ϕ and
F > f , we obtain Π(a) > π(a) iff a < a. Thus, firm a ∈ (0, a) prefers the modern
distribution channel to the marketplace.
The zero cutoff profit condition to enter the marketplace π(a) = 0 yields the threshold












Correspondingly, the zero cutoff profit condition to utilize a modern distribution channel










From assumption (1), threshold productivity ā is determined by6









Therefore, firm a ∈ (a, ā) chooses to produce and sell in the marketplace, and firm a ∈
(0, a) chooses a modern distribution channel.
An equilibrium is characterized by mass N of firms and distribution µ(a) of produc-
tivity levels over a subset of (0, 1). Since any entering firm drawing productivity level






if 0 < a < ā,
0 otherwise.
(4)





















where N and n are the mass of available varieties sold in the modern distribution channel




µ(a)da = N G(a)
G(ā)
, n ≡ N
∫ ā
a
µ(a)da = N G(ā)−G(a)
G(ā)
.







≡ Λ ∈ (0, 1) (6)









We assume Φf < ϕF holds and thus, Λ ∈ (0, 1). Assuming G(a) = aρ, a ∈ (0, 1) and







1 + ρ− σ
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Substituting Eq. (3) into (7), we obtain the equilibrium mass of available varieties:
N ∗ = (1 + ρ− σ)E
ρσf
ϕ
ΦΛ1+2ρ−σ + ϕ(1− Λρ) (1− Λ1+ρ−σ)
. (8)
In this paper, we focus on the interior solution that both the marketplace and modern
distribution channel are active, that is, Λ ∈ (0, 1).
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Substituting Eqs. (2) and (3) into the free entry condition yields
Fe =
σ − 1
δ(1 + ρ− σ)
[
ΛρF + (1− Λρ)f
]
āρ
Thus, indifferent productivity in equilibrium a∗ and threshold productivity in equilibrium
ā∗ are, respectively, given by
ā∗ =
[











ā∗ = Λā∗ (10)
where F̃ ≡ ΛρF + (1− Λρ)f . Thus, we have the following proposition.




holds, the coexistence of a marketplace and modern distri-
bution channel occurs. Furthermore, there will be a sorting of productivity between both,
that is, 0 < a∗ < ā∗ < 1.
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4 Endogenous positive externalities
We now assume that there exist positive externalities in the marketplace through shared
fixed costs. In the marketplace, firms share advertising costs, gather consumer and com-
petitor information, and enjoy public services supported by the marketplace. However,
firms in the marketplace face a high probability of being imitated by competitors, which
results in a loss of revenue in the form of iceberg transaction costs. Thus, a firm entering
the marketplace benefits from low fixed costs at the expense of high variable costs. We
assume that each firm in the marketplace is required to pay fixed cost as follows:
fx =
 f/nx, if nx ≥ 1f, if nx ∈ [0, 1).
where nx is the mass of available varieties sold in the marketplace.




















We focus on the case in which both the marketplace and modern distribution channels
exist, that is, Π(ax) = π(ax) and π(āx) = 0, with ax < āx ∈ (0, 1). Thus, a firm who
draws productivity level a > āx will never produce and exit immediately and µ(a) is the





if 0 < a < āx,
0 otherwise.
(13)


























































1 + ρ− σ
[
ΦΛ1+2ρ−σx + ϕ(1− Λρx)(1− Λ1+ρ−σx )
]
ā1−σx Nx. (16)
Substituting Eq. (12) into (16), the mass of available varieties is determined by:
Nx =
(1 + ρ− σ)E
ρσf
ϕnx













− ϕ(1 + ρ− σ)E
ρσf
= 0. (18)
As shown in Appendix A7, Eq. (18) has at most two roots: Λ∗x,L ∈ [0, 1] and Λ∗x,H ∈ [0, 1],
with Λ∗x,L < Λ
∗
x,H .
8 We refer to Λ∗x,L and Λ
∗
x,H as the L-equilibrium and H-equilibrium,
respectively. Note that Eq. (18) shows the relationship between Φ/ϕ and E/f , even
though Proposition 1 focuses on the relationship between Φ/ϕ and F/f .










Since nx > 1 and ∂Λx/∂nx < 0, we find that Λx < Λ holds. In other words, the share of
firms in the marketplace in the total number of firms increases because of the shared fixed
costs.






7We derive the following results: (1) if E is small enough such that H(Λ0x) ≥ 0, the condition for
(iv) holds (2) if E is large enough such that 0 ≥ limΛx→0 H(Λx), the condition for (iii) holds, and (3)
otherwise, the condition for (i) or (ii) holds.
8Both equilibria Λ∗x,L and Λ
∗









To explain the existence of the two roots of Λx, following Melitz (2003), we denote the












1 + ρ− σ
[
ΦΛ1+2ρ−σx + ϕ(1− Λρx)(1− Λ1+ρ−σx )
]
. (22)
Eq. (22) indicates the relationship between the two ratios of productivity ã1−σx /ā
1−σ
x and
Λx = ax/āx based on the weighted average productivity (WAP), such that the definition
of price index holds. Thus, we call it the WAP curve. Furthermore, Eq. (22) takes the
same form when there is no positive externality of sharing fixed costs. Specifically, Λρx
and 1 − Λρx indicate the share of firms that chooses the modern distribution channel in
the total number of firms and the share of firms located in the marketplace in the total
number of firms, respectively. Note that Λ1+ρ−σx and 1 − Λ1+ρ−σx represent the indexes
of the average productivity of firms choosing a modern distribution channel and that of
firms located in the marketplace, respectively. Thus, when Λx increases, the share of firms
choosing the modern distribution channel Λρx and the index of the average productivity
of these firms, Λ1+ρ−σx , increase. Therefore, the first term in the bracket on the RHS of
Eq. (22) increases, whereas the second term on the RHS decreases because 1 − Λρx and
1 − Λ1+ρ−σx decrease when Λx increases. It can be readily verified that ΓCPI in Eq. (22)
is a convex function of Λx.
9 Therefore, when Λx gradually increases, the first term is
dominated by the second term in Eq. (22) and then the former dominates the latter.










Eq. (23) represents the relationship between the two ratios of productivity ã1−σx /ā
1−σ
x
and Λx such that the zero cutoff profit condition holds. Correspondingly, we call it the
ZCP curve. In particular, the first term on the RHS of Eq. (23) represents the size of





ρ Φ. We also obtain ∂F
2/∂2λ = 1−σ+ρρ λ
1−σ
ρ [(Φ + ϕ) 1−σ+ρρ +
ϕ(σ−1)
λρ ] > 0. Thus,
ΓCPI(Λx) is a convex function of Λx and has a U -shaped curve.
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the economy, whereas the second term on the RHS denotes the share of firms located in
the marketplace, that is, the magnitude of positive externalities in the marketplace from
sharing fixed cost. Therefore, the ratio between the weighted average productivity and
least productivity ã1−σx /ā
1−σ












Figure 1: Multiple equilibria
In sum, Eq. (18) is a combination of the definition of the price index, zero cutoff
profit condition, and the number of firms in the marketplace by the total number of
firms that determines Λx. In Eq. (18), Λx can be interpreted in three ways: Λx is
the ratio of threshold to indifferent productivity, Λρx is the share of firms outside the
marketplace in the total number of firms, and Λ1+ρ−σx are the indexes of the average
productivity of firms choosing a modern distribution channel. The combination of the
zero cutoff profit condition and indifference condition, Eq. (15), determines the number
of firms in the marketplace. Using two determined variables, Λx and nx, the mass of
available varieties, N , is determined by the definition of the number of firms in the
marketplace in the total number of firms. In what follows, using the determined value of
Λx, the combination of free entry condition, zero cutoff profit condition, and indifferent
condition, we determine threshold productivity. Then, we use the definition of Λx to
determine indifferent productivity.
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Substituting Eqs. (11) and (12) into the free entry condition yields
Fe =
σ − 1




where F̃x = Λ
ρ
xF + (1 − Λρx)f/nx. Therefore, the indifferent productivity in equilibrium
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Because nx > 1 and Λx < Λ, it is readily verified that F̃x < F̃ holds from (9) and (25),
which results in ā∗x > ā
∗. In other words, sharing fixed costs allows less productive firms
to survive in the marketplace.


















To clarify the difference between L-equilibrium and H-equilibrium, we turn to the
welfare analysis. Combining Eqs. (16), (17) and (19), the relative price indexes of two






















Eq. (28) implies that individuals in L-equilibrium are happier than those inH-equilibrium;
therefore, the economy chooses the former.

















Finally, combining Eqs. (7), (8), (16), and (17), the relative price indexes in equilib-













(Λ∗)ρF + [1− (Λ∗)ρ]f
(Λ∗x)




Thus, we have (P∗x
P∗
)1−σ
> 1 ⇒ P∗x < P∗.11 (30)
Therefore, when shared fixed costs exist in the marketplace, social welfare is higher. The




(ā∗)1−σ, cost sharing allows for a higher number of firms in a marketplace and a lower
threshold productivity. The former increases the price index, whereas the latter decreases
it. The result shows that the impact of the former dominates that of the latter.
Proposition 2 Because of the shared fixed costs in the marketplace, the threshold pro-
ductivity level for firms to survive in the economy decreases and the number of firms in the
marketplace increases. Furthermore, the impact of greater varieties dominates the impact
of a lower threshold productivity. Thus, individuals are better off sharing fixed costs in
the marketplace.
5 Discussion and Extension
5.1 Human capital accumulation









11By conducting some simple calculations, we derive
P1−σx
P1−σ ≷ 1 ⇔ n
ρ
σ−1
x ΛρxF + n
ρ−σ+1
σ−1
x (1 − Λρx)f ≷
ΛρF + (1− Λρ)f . Since Λx < Λ and nx > 1, the inequality n
ρ−σ+1
σ−1
x (1− Λρx)f > (1− Λρ)f holds. On the









where Ψ(Λx) ≡ −(ϕ + Φ)(1 + ρ− σ)Λ2ρx + [ρΦ + (2ϕ + Φ)(1 + ρ− σ)]Λρx − ϕ(1 + ρ− σ).








In other words, an increase in human capital/population leads to an increase in the share
of the number of firms within the marketplace in the total number of firms under cost
sharing. We obtain ∂Λ∗/∂E = 0 from Eq. (6), which implies that the existence of a scale
economy at the marketplace level affects the share of firms in the marketplace.















Since ∂ā∗/∂E = 0 and ∂a∗/∂E = 0 hold from Eqs. (9) and (10), the scale economy at the
marketplace level allows less productive firms that could not survive without a marketplace
to now make profits and some productive firms that could establish a modern distribution





Figure 2: Impacts of increasing E in L-equilibrium


















We obtain ∂(n∗/N∗)/∂E = 0 since ∂Λ∗/∂E = 0. That is, owing to cost sharing, an in-
crease in human capital accumulation leads to a larger number of firms in the marketplace
in the ratio of varieties within the marketplace to those outside of it.



























x,L) increases when the human capital
of the economy, E, gradually increases. Furthermore, substituting Eq. (8) into (7) and
using ∂ā∗/∂E = 0, we obtain ∂P∗/∂E < 0. That is, social welfare also increases in human
capital even when there is no cost sharing.








1−σ + Φ− ϕ] (a∗x)1−σ
ϕ(ā∗)1−σ
(36)





Although Proposition 2 concludes that individuals are better off sharing fixed costs in the
marketplace, we find that the ratio of relative price indices with and without shared fixed
costs decrease when human capital in the economy increases. The intuition underlying
the shared fixed costs in the marketplace helps less productive firms survive and thus,
increases the total number of varieties in the economy.
Proposition 3 As for increasing human capital with the same magnitude, social welfare
increases far more when there exists cost sharing than without.
5.2 Deregulation policy
We now turn to the impact of deregulating entry control on the establishment of modern
distribution channels such as the reform and open door policy in China. In 1992, China’s
central government relaxed its regulation policy and permitted foreign retail companies
to establish stores and branches in 10 cities in the Hainan Province. Since then, Walmart,
Carrefour, Auchan, and other foreign companies have established stores across China. In
this paper, the deregulation policy allows firms to utilize modern distribution channels
more easily, which implies a decrease in F .






For firms’ profits to be the same within and outside the marketplace, the value of F must
be met as a condition. However, this condition is used to determine the zero cutoff profit
condition, not the value of Λ. From Eq. (19), we find that the number of firms in modern
distribution channels in equilibrium n∗x is determined by Λ
∗
















This result is obtained from the combination of the zero cutoff profit condition and indif-
ferent condition. Without cost sharing, Eq. (6) provides that ∂Λ∗/∂F < 0, which implies
that the share of firms using modern distribution channels increases by reducing fixed
costs outside the marketplace under no cost sharing. This results from the choice of firms
between the production condition within and outside the marketplace.





























Eqs. (39) and (40) imply that both indifferent productivity a∗x and threshold productivity
ā∗x increase when F decreases. The decrease of F implies reduced average fixed costs F̃x in
the economy under the constant share of firms in the marketplace, which induces further
firms entries. Thus, deregulating the establishment of modern distribution channels allows
less productive firms to survive in the economy ( see Fig. 3). In the absence of cost sharing,
since ∂F̃/∂F = Λρ[1−ρ/(σ−1)] < 0, we obtain ∂ā∗/∂F > 0. In other words, deregulating
the establishment of modern distribution channels creates opposing impacts on threshold





Figure 3: Impacts of decreasing F in L-equilibrium
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From Eqs. (17) and (19), we obtain
N ∗x =




2ρ + ϕ[1− (Λ∗x)ρ][(Λ∗x)σ−1 − (Λ∗x)ρ]
. (41)























Eq. (43) implies that the numbers of active firms in the marketplace and modern distribu-
tion channels increase, while the ratio of indifferent productivity to threshold productivity
remains unchanged during the process of deregulating the establishment of modern dis-
tribution channels.









δ(1 + ρ− σ)Fe
σ − 1
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Proposition 4 If the government relaxes the regulation on the establishment of modern
distribution channels (i.e., the fixed costs of firms outside the marketplace F decreases),
less productive firms can survive in the economy and the number of available varieties
increases. However, the numbers of active firms in the marketplace and in modern dis-
tribution channels increase, while the ratio of indifferent productivity to threshold pro-
ductivity remains unchanged. Finally, the effect of expanding varieties dominates that of
decreasing survival productivity, which results in the improvement of social welfare during
deregulation process.
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In both cases, threshold productivity and the size of marketplace increase when E in-
creases or F decreases. Thus, the two variables have opposing impacts on social welfare.
This is because increasing the size of a marketplace has two effects: (i) less efficient firms
can survive and sell products at higher prices and (ii) all firms within the marketplace
benefit from the marketplacelevel scale economy because of greater varieties. The propo-
sitions show that the latter dominates the former.
Finally, in the benchmark case, substituting Eq. (8) into (7), we obtain ∂P∗/∂F > 0
since ∂ā∗/∂F > 0. That is, in the case without shared fixed costs in the marketplace, the
decrease of fixed costs outside the marketplace leads to the exit of less productive firms,
which results in higher social welfare.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we extended Melitz’s (2003) model by introducing lower fixed costs and
higher transaction costs in a marketplace. In doing so, we attempted to identify the con-
ditions for the coexistence of heterogeneous firms within and outside the marketplace. To
examine the impact of shared fixed cost among firms in a marketplace, we compared two
cases with and without shared cost. In addition, we examined the impacts of population
size and fixed costs of modern distribution channels.
We clarified that the decreasing fixed costs of modern distribution channels leads to
a larger marketplace with cost sharing. This is because lower fixed costs in modern
distribution channels positively affect firms’ entry decisions. Thus, a large number of
entry firms triggers scale economy in the marketplace, which results in an increase in the
size of the marketplace.
Given the flexibility of our model, there are numerous research directions for future
works. It is natural to extend this setting to a two-region model, which can further clarify
the impact of market size during the integration process. Furthermore, an empirical study
20
that tests the relationship between country size and the size of a marketplace can identify
externalities that foster the development of marketplaces.
A Number of roots




























Ψ(Λx) = −ϕ(1 + ρ− σ) < 0, lim
Λx→1
Ψ(Λx) =ρΦ > 0.











(1 + 2ρ− σ)2Φ + 4ρ(1 + ρ− σ)ϕ
] 1
ρ





Therefore, the number of roots of Eq. (18) can be concluded as follows:




x if and only ifH(Λ0x) = 0.
(ii) there are two roots: Λ∗x,L ∈ (0,Λ0x) and Λ∗x,H ∈ (Λ0x, 1) if and only if H(Λ0x) ≤ 0 ≤
limΛx→0H(Λx).
(iii) there are two roots: Λ∗x,L = 0 and Λ
∗
x,H ∈ (Λ0x, 1) if and only if 0 ≥ limΛx→0 H(Λx).










Figure 4: Multiple equilibria
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